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Standard of Review under the Toxic
Substances Control Act: Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. E.P.A.
JOYCE MERRITT*
INTRODUCTION
In recognition of the serious chemical hazards to health and
the environment and the inadequacy of the existing piecemeal
regulations,' Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA" or "Act").2 Congress wrestled for six years on the
toxic substances issue before the final adoption of the TSCA.3
The TSCA gives broad authority to the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") to regulate the manufacturing, importa-
tion, processing, distribution, use and disposal of chemical
substances.4 The TSCA has several major purposes. First, the
Act seeks to screen new chemicals to determine whether they
pose a risk to health and the environment.' Second, the TSCA
requires testing of chemicals which the EPA identifies as possible
* Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.
University of Kentucky, Class of 1994; B.A., Marshall University, 1991.
MARY D. WOROBEC & GIRARD ORDWAY, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROLS GUIDE
13 (1989).
1 Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 [hereinafter TSCA], Pub. L. No. 94-469,
§ 30, 90 Stat. 2050 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§2601-2629 (1976)).
1 For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the TSCA, see generally
RAY M. DRULEY & GIRARD L. ORDWAY, THE ToxIc SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 10 (rev.
ed. 1981).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). For an explanation of what constitutes a chem-
ical substance, see S. REp. No. 94-698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-105 (1976) reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491-4590. For more discussion of the breadth of the TSCA see
Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of Occupational Safety and Health
Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 969, 980 (1986 -87).
1 Under TSCA § 5(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1) (1976), a premanufacture noti-
fication, or "PMN," must be submitted to the EPA at least 90 days prior to commercial
manufacture or import of any chemical substance that is not on a list of chemicals in
commerce that is compiled and maintained by the EPA. This list is the "TSCA Inventory
of Chemical Substances," and was compiled pursuant to § 8(b) of the Act. The Inventory
consists of all commercial chemical substances initially compiled by the EPA pursuant
to § 8(b), plus all commercial chemicals which have passed PMN review under § 5.
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risks. 6 Third, the Act seeks to gather information on existing
chemicals 7 and gives the EPA the power to control those chem-
icals which pose a risk.
8
Under Section 6 of the Act, the EPA may prohibit or limit
the manufacturing, processing, distribution, use or disposal of a
chemical which poses an unreasonable risk to health or the
environmentY Under this section, Congress granted the EPA a
wide range of options, from requiring warning labels, to man-
dating a complete ban on production, import, and use of dan-
gerous chemicals in the United States.'0 The EPA must, however,
formulate regulations which are the least burdensome necessary
to achieve their objectives of controlling the chemical which
poses the unreasonable risk to health or the environment." "The
Agency must list the substance's effects and the effects of ex-
posure to it both on humans and on the environment, the
benefits of use and availability of substitutes, and the economic
consequences of EPA's proposed action on the economy, small
business, and technical innovation.'
' 2
The EPA recently used its authority under Section 6 of the
TSCA for the first time in banning a dangerous substance, but
in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. E.P.A.,'1 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals remanded the EPA's final rule prohibiting the man-
ufacture and sale of asbestos in almost all products.'
4
This Comment places Corrosion Proof Fittings in its histor-
ical perspective by discussing some prior decisions which utilized
6 Under TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1976), the Administrator can require that
testing be conducted on any substance or mixture which poses a risk to health or the
environment if there is an insufficiency of data to determine whether an unreasonable
risk is present.
I TSCA § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1976) provides, in relevant part, that "le]ach
person ... who manufactures or processes or proposes to manufacture or process a
chemical substance .. .shall maintain such records, and shall submit to the Adminis-
trator such reports as the Administrator may reasonably require ...."
I TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1976) provides, in relevant part, that "If the
Administrator finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture,
processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture,
or that any combination of such activity, presents or will present an unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment, the Administrator shall by rule ... protect
adequately against such risk ......
TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1976).
I d.
Id.; see also WOROBaEC & ORDWAY, supra note 1, at 33-34.
2 WROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 1, at 33-34.
" Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
'" Id. at 1207.
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the same standard of review, by examining the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings, and by examining the
impact of Corrosion Proof Fittings on the power of the EPA.
I. TIE EARLIER CASES
It is a long-held view that an agency's decisions concerning
its rulemaking procedures are entitled to great deference because
agencies are the "best situated to determine how they should
allocate their finite resources."1 5
The deference traditionally afforded to the EPA, specifically,
has been great, even when the subject matter involved in the
dispute is the environment versus business. Two recent Supreme
Court cases illustrate this struggle. First, in E.P.A. v. Natl
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 6 the Supreme Court upheld the EPA's
policy of withholding variances from individual polluters who
are economically unable to comply with the 1977 effluent limi-
tations promulgated under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 7 In upholding the EPA's policy, the Court showed "great
deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers
or agency charged with its administration."'" This decision up-
held a very rigid EPA policy in the face of potentially severe
economic impacts. In a report prepared jointly by the EPA, the
Commerce Department and the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (CEQ), it was estimated that there would be 200 to 300 plant
closings caused by the first set of pollution limitations.' 9
The Supreme Court tackled the struggle between the EPA
and business a second time in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.20 Reaffirming a judicial pol-
icy of deference to the EPA, the Supreme Court upheld a rigid
policy of not allowing exceptions for businesses, on the basis of
economic circumstances when failing to meet best practicable
control technology (BPT) and best available technology econom-
ically achievable (BAT) requirements set by the EPA. 21 The
Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 563 F.2d 191, 201 (5th Cir.
1977).
6 Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
33 U.S.C.S. §1251 et seq.
" Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. at 83.
6 Id. at 80.
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
I d.
1992-931
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Court held that the "view of the agency charged with adminis-
tering the statute is entitled to considerable deference." 22 The
Court refused to substitute its judgment for that of the EPA
solely on the basis that there were other policies available which
the EPA might have adopted.
23
While the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the
EPA when it must weigh environmental quality and economic
viability, this deference has not been without limitations. As
early as 1971, the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe,2 4 established that while the court's review
is indeed narrow and that it ordinarily does not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency involved, the court will continue
to undertake a "substantial inquiry" and a "thorough, probing,
in-depth review." 2 While many courts have disagreed on the
degree of judicial scrutiny required or provided by Overton
Park,26 the Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council and Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n decisions illus-
trate the continuing power of the EPA.
Despite the scrutiny over agencies' rulemaking articulated by
the courts in 1971,27 courts have attempted to strike a delicate
balance between agency deference and substantial inquiry. While
Overton Park afforded the courts the power to probe agency
decisions more carefully, most courts continued to defer to the
EPA. In Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 21 the majority following Over-
ton Park stated that the "reviewing court had an obligation to
engage in a searching and complete review of the facts." '29 The
Court also noted that the "reviewing court must defer if the
agency has a rational basis for its decision." 3 Thus, under the
substantial evidence inquiry, courts have been mindful of their
balancing role. They must give careful scrutiny to the agency's




Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
2, Id. at 415.
See, e.g., Kevin Gaynor, The Toxic Substances Control Act, 30 VAND. L. REV.
1149 (1977).
25 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. Mr. 19, 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
" Gaynor, supra note 26, at 1158.
1 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 35.
3 See, Envtl. Defense Fund v. E.P.A., 636 F.2d 1267, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see
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Courts typically note the importance of allowing a better
informed agency to make administrative decisions. But, they
keep a watchful eye so as to make sure those decisions are
justified.
II. CORROSION PROOF FITTINGS v. E.P.A.
A. Background and Facts
The EPA began proceedings in 1979 to reduce the risk to
health and the environment by exposure to asbestos.3 2 A panel
appointed by the EPA conducted public meetings and reviewed
over a hundred asbestos studies.3 As a result, the EPA con-
cluded that "asbestos is a potential carcinogen at all levels of
exposure .... -34 In 1989, the EPA issued the final rule prohib-
iting the manufacture and sale of almost all asbestos products."5
Applying TSCA's substantial evidence standard for reviewing
agency findings, the Fifth Circuit held that the EPA presented
insufficient evidence to justify a total asbestos ban.3 6 This was
the first use of the power granted by Congress to the EPA under
Section 6 of the TSCA to ban a dangerous substance. The EPA
contended that the ban would save either 148 or 202 lives at a
cost of $450 to 800 million. 7
Regarding EPA's rulemaking defects, the Court held that
the denial of cross-examination of some of its witnesses and
failure to provide public notice of its use of analogous exposure
estimates before closing the hearing record, together deprived
also Yaffe Iron & Metal Co. v. E.P.A., 774 F.2d 1008, 1014 (10th Cir. 1985) (supports
deference to agencies, while noting that substantial evidence is more tfian a mere
"scintilla;" upholds the reasonable person standard to determine what constitutes sub-
stantial evidence.)
- Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1207. For an examination of the harms
of asbestos claimed by the EPA, see generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
GUIDANCE FOR CONTROLLING AsBESTOs-CONTAINING MATERIAI.S IN BUULDINGS (June 1985);
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR CONTROLLING FRIABLE ASBESTOS-CONTAIN-
ING MATERIALS IN BUILDINGS (Mar. 1983); ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A GUaDE TO
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION FOR THE AsaEsTos ABATEMENT INDUSTRY (Sept. 1986).
1 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1207.
' Id.
11 Id. at 1207-08.
36 Id.
" Id. at 1208.
1992-93]
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the final rule of the substantial evidence necessary to survive
judicial review.3"
The TSCA also instructs the EPA to undertake the least
burdensome regulations,39 and the Court held that the substantial
evidence test requires more scrutiny for a total ban of a danger-
ous substance than for other administrative actions.4
B. The EPA 's Burden Under TSCA
In Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. E.P.A. ,4 the Court
provided the basic framework for reviewing the EPA's actions
under the TSCA. The EPA must show: (1) the quantities of the
chemical in question are substantial; and (2) the human exposure
to the chemical is substantial. 42 The Court, however, recognized
that "substantial" is difficult to define 3.4  The Court noted that
it defers to agencies in their rulemaking, but requires the agency
to articulate its findings so the court can determine whether the
EPA "engaged in balanced, informed decisionmaking." 44 The
Court remanded the decision to the EPA to "articulate the
standards or criteria on the basis of which it found the quantities
.. . to be 'substantial'. ' 45 The decision to remand this case was
consistent with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Shell Chemical Co.
v. E.P.A., which held that remand is appropriate in close cases
under substantial review."
The TSCA provides that a reviewing court shall hold
unlawful and set aside a final rule promulgated under Section 6
of the Act "if the court finds that the rule is not supported by
substantial evidence . . . -,4 The TSCA also requires that the
EPA use the least burdensome regulation necessary to achieve
its objectives of minimum reasonable risk. 48 Congress did not
11 Id. at 1212.
3 TSCA § 6.
, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216.
" Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 899 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1990).
,2 Id. at 357.
41 Id. at 359.
" Id.(quoting Texas Power & Light v. F.C.C., 784 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir.
1986)).
" Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 899 F.2d at 360.
' Shell Chem., 826 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1987).
47 TSCA § 19, 15 U.S.C. §2618(c)(!)(B)(i) (1976).
" TSCA § 6; see also, H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1976),
reprinted in DRULEY & ORDWAY, THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (1981).
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enact TSCA as a zero-risk statute.4 9 TSCA is a "risk/benefit-
balancing statute." 50 The Court held that because the EPA chose
the harshest remedy available under the Act, the EPA had a
difficult burden to prove substantial evidence warranted such a
remedy." The EPA did not calculate the risk levels for inter-
mediate levels of regulation .
2
In order to survive judicial scrutiny under the substantial
evidence standard provided by the TSCA, the EPA must prove
that asbestos presents an unreasonable risk of harm to humans
and the environment." Any review of TSCA necessarily involves
the concept of unreasonable risk.5 4 "This concept is central to
TSCA and findings concerning unreasonable risk are a prereq-
uisite to most EPA regulatory action under the statute."" Con-
gress realized that this was a difficult concept to define and thus
set only general standards for the EPA when examining regula-
tions.5 6 In general, though, in order "to make a determination
that a risk associated with a chemical is unreasonable, the EPA
must balance the probability that a harm will occur and the
magnitude and severity of the harm against the effect of the
proposed regulatory action on the availability to society of the
benefits of the substance of mixture, taking into account the
availability of substitutes and other adverse effects. 5 7 In eval-
uating unreasonable risk of injury, the Court was careful to note
that they are not a regulatory agency, but still concluded that
the EPA "basically ignored the cost side of the TSCA equa-
tion. ' '58
Consistent with its previous decisions of Chemical Manufac-
turers Ass'n v. E.P.A. and Shell Chemical Co., the Court in
Corrosion Proof Fittings was mindful of the considerable def-
erence traditionally afforded to agencies when they engage in
, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1215.
so WOROBEC & ORDWAY, supra note 1, at 17.
, Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216.
52 Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1214.
See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regu-
latory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 201 (1991).
1 Stillman & Wheeler, supra note 4, at 982.
56 H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976), reprinted in DRULEY &
ORDWAY, THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 185-86 (1981).
17 Id.; CONFERENCE COMM., 74th Cong., 2d Sess., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT,
reprinted in DRULEY & ORDWAY, THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 145 (1981).
" Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1222-23.
1992-931
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rulemaking.19 In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Court concluded
that the EPA had not provided the substantial evidence required
to withstand judicial scrutiny, even though the EPA is judged
by relatively lenient standards.60
The discussion by the Court regarding least burdensome
regulation and unreasonable risk are consistent with past Fifth
Circuit opinions.6' However, the Fifth Circuit has gone beyond
the Chem. Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Res. Defense Coun.
and Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n decisions rendered by the Su-
preme Court. As set forth in Corrosion Proof Fittings, the EPA
attempted to use Section 6 to ban almost all asbestos products,
regardless of whether there was a currently available substitute.62
The EPA contended that if the companies did not develop
substitutes, "the waiver provision would allow the continued use
of asbestos in these areas, just as if the ban had not occurred
at all." 63 This argument parallels the arguments used by the
EPA in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council and National Crushed Stone Assn'n where the
EPA was forcing a strict standard much like the one attempted
in Corrosion Proof Fittings. In each case, exceptions were not
allowed based on economic inability to comply with the regula-
tion.61 The EPA argued in Corrosion Proof Fittings that excep-
tions would render their efforts meaningless. However, contrary
to the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit
struck down the attempt by the EPA to ban asbestos, regardless
of available substitutes. 6 The difference in these results may
" Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1211, 1212, 1219, 1222. 1226, 1229.
Id. at 1212.
61 See Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 563 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.
1977); see also Shell Chem. Co. v. E.P.A., 826 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1987) (case remanded
to EPA to reconsider its rule requiring manufacturers and processors of mesityl oxide
to test the substance for its harmful effects on human health in light of new information
discovered after the rules promulgation); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. E.P.A., 899 F.2d 344
(5th Cir. 1990) (case remanded to E.P.A. "to articulate the standards of criteria on
which it found the quantities of cumen entering the environment from the facilities in
question to be 'substantial' and the human exposure potentially resulting to be 'substan-
tial'.").
8' Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1220.
63 Id.
6 See E.P.A. v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980); see also Chem.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Defense Coucil, 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
61 See, Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. at 68; see also Chem. Manufacturers
Ass'n, 470 U.S. at 131-132.
Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1220.
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stem from the language in the Act itself. The TSCA specifically
instructs the EPA to consider the "relative merits of its ban, as
compared to the economic effects of its actions." 67 Subsequently,
the failure of the EPA to specifically consider the economic
effects by examining less burdensome regulations, results in a
lack of substantial evidence justifying a total ban.6
The Fifth Circuit viewed the burden of the EPA as being
stricter than provided by the Supreme Court and remanded the
decision to the EPA to provide more evidence justifying a total
ban. The substantial evidence standard utilized by the Fifth
Circuit in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. E.P.A., was consis-
tently applied in Corrosion Proof Fittings and, consistent with
Shell Chemical, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the EPA
for more clarity.
C. Corrosion Proof Fittings' Further Narrowing of EPA
Power
The Fifth Circuit's opinion will narrow the EPA's power in
regulating toxic substances. The first time the EPA attempted
to use the power granted to it in 1976 by Congress under Section
6 to ban a dangerous substance, it was unsuccessful. Throughout
the decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that the EPA must be
afforded the appropriate level of deference. 69 However, the Court
went beyond the traditional judicial inquiry in this case. The
Supreme Court has afforded the EPA considerable deference
and the Fifth Circuit, until now, balanced deference with sub-
stantial inquiry carefully.
70
The Court also held that not informing the public of its
intent to use analogous exposure estimates deprived the EPA of
substantial evidence. 7' The Court went on to say "we are con-
cerned about some of the methodology employed by the EPA
in making various of the calculations that it did perform.
72
Furthermore, the Court examined the methods by which the
EPA computed the costs and benefits of its proposed rule73 and
11 Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1215.
69 Id. at 1211, 1212, 1219, 1222, 1226, 1229.
,a See, Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.R.D.C., 470 U.S. 116 (1985); see also, E.P.A. v.
Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980).
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analyzed its calculations. The Court held that it was possible for
the EPA to discount the benefit of human life. 74 The Court said
that the EPA did not use an appropriate time frame and, as a
result, the Court was concerned about the unquantifiable lives
the EPA estimated they were saving after the year 2000. 75 The
Court also said the EPA placed too great a reliance on the
concept of population exposure when it made its calculations.
76
This unprecedented inquiry by the Fifth Circuit into the
specific methodology employed by the EPA has defined the new
role of the court in determining whether agency actions are
reasonable. The courts can now determine the adequacy of the
methodology employed by the administrative agency, as well as
the conclusion the agency reaches.
CONCLUSION
The EPA attempted, without success, for the first time to
use Section 6 of the TSCA to ban a dangerous substance. The
examination by the Fifth Circuit Court into the EPA's meth-
odology was more probing than in previous decisions and, as a
result, further narrows the power of the EPA through the sub-
stantial evidence standard. This decision also defines Section 6
of the TSCA and sets the standard for review of EPA actions
under Section 6 of the TSCA.
In 1977 it was noted that "reviewing courts are deferring to
the Administrators' judgment when [s]he acts to protect public
health, regardless of whether they are applying. . .a substantial
evidence standard. In light of the legislative history of the TSCA,
reviewing courts will likely construe the term 'evidence' to in-
clude speculations and extrapolations based upon available
knowledge." 7  The decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings, how-
ever, turns the attempt by Congress to protect health and the
environment, by allowing the EPA to ban dangerous substances
under the TSCA, into a virtually useless tool.78
", Id.
16 Id. at 1219.
" Gaynor, supra note 26, at 1161.
" Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and
Protecting the Environment. 22 ENvTL. L. 33 n.66 (1991).
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